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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 The High Commissioner for Human Rights is the 
principal human rights official of the United Nations. 
The High Commissioner heads the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and 
spearheads the United Nations’ human rights efforts. 
 OHCHR has a mandate to promote and protect 
the enjoyment and full realization, by all people, of all 
rights established in the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in international human rights laws and 
treaties. OHCHR is guided in its work by the man-
date provided by the General Assembly in resolution 
48/141, the Charter of the United Nations, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent 
human rights instruments, the Vienna Declaration 
and Program of Action from the 1993 World Confer-
ence on Human Rights, and the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document.  
 The mandate includes preventing human rights 
violations, securing respect for all human rights, 
promoting international cooperation to protect hu-
man rights, coordinating related activities throughout 
the United Nations, and strengthening and stream-
lining the United Nations system in the field of 
 
 1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in 
part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No 
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel 
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. 
2 
human rights. Furthermore, the Office leads efforts to 
integrate a human rights approach within all work 
carried out by United Nations agencies.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Holding corporations liable for human rights 
violations is fully consistent with international law. 
At the heart of this case is the value we attach to the 
idea of the rule of law, an idea expressed in the fol-
lowing simple statement: “Be you never so high, the 
law is above you.” Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law 4 
(2010) (quoting Dr. Thomas Fuller, 1654-1734). 
 The battle for subjecting human rights violators 
to the rule of international law has been fought and 
won against natural persons, groups, organizations 
and States. On a proper understanding of contempo-
rary international law, corporations are also subject 
to the rule of law on the international plane, in which 
they ubiquitously operate. Under that law, they are 
accountable for human rights violations. In particu-
lar, corporations are not immune from responsibility 
under international law if they engage in, or are 
complicit in, conduct amounting to international 
crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity or 
war crimes. 
 The United States has an obligation as a member 
of the United Nations “to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the Organization” to pro-
mote “universal respect for, and observance of, 
3 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all....” 
U.N. Charter art. 55-56. From the perspective of 
international law, action by a State’s highest court 
is equivalent to action by the State’s legislative or 
executive organs: all are equally acts of the State. See 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 4(1), 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (“The conduct of any State 
organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legis-
lative, executive, judicial or any other functions....”). 
Therefore, when this Court decides this case, the 
Court is acting as an agent of the United States to 
execute – or refuse to execute – the nation’s interna-
tional legal obligation to promote human rights. 
 General principles of law common to domestic 
legal systems throughout the world are an independ-
ent source of international law. Virtually every nation 
in the world imposes civil liability on artificial per-
sons for the tortious conduct of their agents. Hence, 
the principle that corporations are subject to civil 
liability for the wrongful conduct of corporate agents 
is a general principle of law applicable by this Court 
in cases presenting claims based on international law. 
 The proposition that corporations may be held 
accountable for human rights violations pursuant to 
the Alien Tort Statute is wholly consistent with 
international law and is validated by the following 
considerations. First, international law obligates 
States to provide an effective remedy for victims of 
human rights violations. Second, civil liability for 
4 
corporations helps promote the international legal 
principle of ensuring accountability for human rights 
violators. Third, in accordance with the principle of 
complementarity, international law necessarily relies 
on domestic legal mechanisms to ensure the effective 
protection of human rights. Finally, civil liability for 
corporations that are complicit in gross human rights 
violations serves as an avenue for orderly redress 
of grievances. Absent effective legal mechanisms to 
provide remedies for victims of gross human rights 
violations, those victims are likely to resort to extra-
legal measures to obtain redress for perceived wrongs, 
thereby threatening the established legal and social 
order. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. International Law Obligates States to 
Provide Effective Remedies for Victims of 
Human Rights Violations  
 International law requires States to provide an 
effective remedy for breach of a right guaranteed by 
international law. In the Factory at Chorzów case, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated: “It is 
a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that the breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation in an ade-
quate form.” Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13). Thus, under 
widely accepted principles of customary international 
law, an act or omission contrary to international law is 
5 
a “breach of an engagement” that triggers “an obliga-
tion to make reparation in an adequate form.” Id. 
Adequate reparation can take many forms, including 
“[r]estitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, pay-
ment of a sum corresponding to the value which a 
restitution in kind would bear.” Id. at 47; see also 
Report of the International Law Commission to the 
General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-Third 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l Law Comm’n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/ 
Add.1 (Part 2). 
 
A. Human Rights Treaties Obligate States 
to Provide Effective Remedies for Vic-
tims of Human Rights Violations 
 The principle of effective remedy, or effective 
reparation, is a golden thread that runs through all 
modern international human rights treaties. Profes-
sor Theo van Boven, an expert in the field of remedies 
for violations of international human rights law, 
explained the legal principle as follows: “As the result 
of an international normative process the legal basis 
for a right to a remedy and reparation became firmly 
anchored in the elaborate corpus of international 
human rights instruments, now widely ratified by 
States.” Theo van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy 
and Reparation: The New United Nations Principles 
and Guidelines, in Reparations for Victims of Geno-
cide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: 
Systems in Place and Systems in the Making 21 
6 
(Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens 
eds., 2009). 
 Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights expresses this principle as follows: “Everyone 
has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 
217A, art. 8, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). Similarly, article 2(3) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights obligates States “to ensure that any person 
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy,” and “[t]o 
ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall 
have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities.” 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 The principle of effective remedy is codified in 
every significant international human rights treaty at 
both global and regional levels. For example, global 
human rights treaties that codify this principle 
include the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 6, 
Sept. 28, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 
  
7 
U.N.T.S. 195;2 the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85;3 and article 83 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, art. 83, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3.4 
 
 2 Article 6 states: 
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through 
the competent national tribunals and other State in-
stitutions, against any acts of racial discrimination 
which violate his human rights and fundamental 
freedoms contrary to this Convention as well as the 
right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate 
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as 
a result of such discrimination. 
 3 Article 14 states: 
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that 
the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has 
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensa-
tion including the means for as full rehabilitation as 
possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a 
result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be en-
titled to compensation.... Nothing in this Article shall 
affect any right of the victim or other person to com-
pensation which may exist under national law. 
 4 Article 83 states: 
Each State Party to the present Convention under-
takes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have 
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the viola-
tion has been committed by persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity; (b) To ensure that any persons seeking 
such a remedy shall have his or her claim reviewed 
and decided by competent judicial, administrative or 
(Continued on following page) 
8 
Regional human rights treaties that codify this prin-
ciple include the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by 
Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, ETS No. 155);5 the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights, arts. 25 and 63, Nov. 
22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123;6 and the Protocol to the 
 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent au-
thority provided for by the legal system of the State, 
and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To 
ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce 
such remedies when granted. 
 5 Article 13 states: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set 
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy 
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” 
 6 Article 25(1) states:  
Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, 
or any other effective recourse, to a competent court or 
tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fun-
damental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of 
the state concerned or by this Convention, even though 
such violation may have been committed by persons 
acting in the course of their official duties. 
 Article 25(2) adds:  
The States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any 
person claiming such remedy shall have his rights de-
termined by the competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the state; (b) to develop the possibil-
ities of judicial remedy; and (c) to ensure that the 
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies 
when granted. 
 Article 63(1) provides: 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a 
right or freedom protected by this Convention, the 
(Continued on following page) 
9 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, art. 25, July 11, 2003, 
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, available at http://www. 
achpr.org/english/_info/women_en.html.7  
 
B. The Practice of States and Interna-
tional Tribunals Supports the Princi-
ple of Effective Remedy 
 Under traditional principles of customary inter-
national law, the duty to make reparation for an 
injury is inseparable from the concept of state re-
sponsibility for an internationally wrongful act. See F. 
V. García-Amador, Louis B. Sohn & Richard R. Bax-
ter, Recent Codifications of the Law of State Respon-
sibility for Injuries to Aliens 8-9 (1974). Thus, a State 
can be held liable both for the underlying breach of 
an international human rights obligation and for the 
failure to provide an effective remedy for that breach. 
 In recent years, international law has placed 
great emphasis on reparation for victims of human 
 
Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It 
shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences 
of the measure or situation that constituted the 
breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that 
fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 
 7 Article 25 provides: “States Parties shall undertake to: (a) 
provide for appropriate remedies to any woman whose rights or 
freedoms, as herein recognized, have been violated; (b) ensure 
that such remedies are determined by competent judicial, ad-
ministrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by law.” 
10 
rights violations, especially for violations of interna-
tional criminal norms. See, e.g., Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 
2 Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes 6-7 (2008); Repara-
tions for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes 
Against Humanity: Systems in Place and Systems in 
the Making (Carla Ferstman et al. eds., 2009). 
 The Basic Principles on the Right to a Remedy, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 without 
a vote, and hence reflecting the unanimous consent of 
UN member states, reaffirms the right to an effective 
remedy. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 
60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/496/42/PDF/N0549642. 
pdf ?OpenElement [hereinafter, Basic Principles]; see 
also UN Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC] Basic Prin-
ciples and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, ECOSOC Res. 
2005/30, ¶ 18 (July 25, 2005), available at http://www. 
un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2005/resolution%202005-30.pdf.  
 This emphasis on reparation for victims is consis-
tent with laws in national jurisdictions, which have 
developed mechanisms for civil reparation for crime 
victims to complement criminal punishment of hu-
man rights offenders. See Council of Europe, Ex-
planatory Report to the European Convention on the 
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Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, ¶ 1 (1984), 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/ 
Html/116.htm.; Jo Goodey, Compensating Victims of 
Violent Crime in the European Union With a Special 
Focus on Victims of Terrorism 1 (May 2003) (discussion 
paper for National Center for Victims of Crime), avail-
able at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/ 
documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=32594. 
 Article 75(1) of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) exemplifies these recent trends; 
it requires the ICC to establish principles relating to 
reparation for victims, including restitution, compen-
sation and rehabilitation. Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, art. 75, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3. In contrast, statutes of older international 
criminal tribunals were silent on reparation, except 
that they empowered judges to order restitution of 
property as an incident to a guilty verdict. See Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da (ICTR), art. 24(3), S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
art. 24(3), S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 
25, 1993); see also Antonio Cassese, International 
Criminal Law 422-23 (2d ed. 2008).  
 Consistent with the other developments dis-
cussed above, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights established a high level panel to prepare a 
report and recommendations on reparation for women 
victims of sexual violence in armed conflicts in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. See United 
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Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Report of the Panel on Remedies and Repara-
tions for Victims of Sexual Violence in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo to the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (March 2011), available at http://www. 
ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/DRC_Reparations_ 
Report_en.pdf. 
 
C. Corporations are Not Exempt from the 
Duty to Provide Effective Remedies 
for Human Rights Violations 
 Although the general rule of effective remedy, as 
a principle of international law, has its origins in 
traditional doctrines of State responsibility, corpora-
tions are not exempt from the duty to provide effec-
tive remedies. Any exemption from the general rule 
must be founded upon a rational theory that vali-
dates the exception. It cannot depend upon a casuistic 
attempt to preserve or exploit an apparent loophole in 
the law. Indeed, an exception for corporations cannot 
be justified, either as a matter of common sense or in 
terms of traditional or evolving principles of interna-
tional law. 
 The term “reparation” has different meanings 
under international law, as illustrated by the Inter-
national Law Association’s Declaration of Interna-
tional Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of 
Armed Conflict (Substantive Issues), 74 Int’l L. Ass’n 
Rep. Conf. 291 (2010), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/. In the first paragraph of article 1, the ILA 
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Declaration defines ‘reparation’ to include “measures 
that seek to eliminate all the harmful consequences of 
a violation of rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict and to re-establish the situation that 
would have existed if the violation had not occurred.” 
Id. art. 1(1). The second paragraph of article 1 ex-
plains that the goal of reparation can be accomplished 
by means of “restitution, compensation, satisfaction 
and guarantees and assurances of non-repetition, 
either singly or in combination.” Id. art. 1(2). 
 The ILA provisions are a synthesis of definitions 
appearing in earlier international documents. The 
earliest of these instruments, the ILC’s Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts provides as follows: “Full reparation for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act 
shall take the form of restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction, either singly or in combination....” Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 34, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001).8 Similarly, the Basic Principles 
 
 8 The International Law Commission is a body of experts 
created by the UN General Assembly and charged with the 
“progressive development” and “codification” of international 
law. Although the Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsi-
bility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts are labeled 
“draft articles,” the cited draft is the final version. The “Draft 
Articles” are generally viewed as an authoritative expression of 
customary international law. See James Crawford, The Interna-
tional Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002). 
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and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tion for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law – as adopted by the UN 
General Assembly, the UN Economic and Social 
Council, and the Commission on Human Rights – 
explains that the notion of “full and effective repara-
tion” includes “restitution, compensation, rehabilita-
tion, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.” 
See Basic Principles, supra, ¶ 18. In particular, the 
Basic Principles also stipulate that “[i]n cases where 
a person, a legal person, or other entity is found liable 
for reparation to a victim, such party should provide 
reparation to the victim or compensate the State if 
the State has already provided reparation to the 
victim.” Id., ¶ 15 (emphasis added). 
 Thus, the proposition that corporations are not 
accountable for violations of international human 
rights law ignores a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law: the principle that victims of human rights 
violations are entitled to an effective remedy. Without 
detracting from the value of other types of reparation, 
it bears emphasis that the guarantee of non-
repetition is a method of reparation that underscores 
the elementary flaw in the proposition that corpora-
tions are not accountable for international human 
rights violations. If corporations could not be held 
accountable, then corporations could continue to 
violate human rights without any compelling need to 
cease and desist; this is contrary to the principle that 
reparation includes a guarantee of non-repetition. It 
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would be more than an act of “passive injustice”9 to 
accept such a grotesque interpretation of internation-
al law. 
 International law protects victims from human 
rights violations committed by States, natural per-
sons, and other types of organizations.10 See Phillipe 
Sands & Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International 
Institutions, ch. 15 (6th ed. 2009); see also Andrew 
Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors, 63-69 (2006). In these circumstances, a rule of 
law exempting corporations from the same liability 
for human rights violations that encumbers all other 
actors in the international legal system would be a 
brazen perpetuation of the axiom that “corporate 
status has long implied economic and political power 
without accountability.” David Millon, The Ambigu-
ous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 Stan. 
Agora 1 (2001); see also Stephen Tully, Corporations 
and International Lawmaking (2007) (especially 
chapters 1 and 2). Such a state of affairs would be 
intolerable in an international legal order that has 
repeatedly emphasized the need for accountability for 
 
 9 As Judith Shklar helpfully reminds us, “passive injustice” 
includes the silent acceptance of “laws that we regard as unjust, 
unwise or cruel.” Judith N. Shklar, Faces of Injustice 6 (1990). 
 10 Juridical persons other than corporations also have obli-
gations under international law. For example, in non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, non-State armed groups are also bound 
by international humanitarian law. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law, Vol. I: Rules 495-98 (2005). 
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human rights violations. Corporations are not above 
the law that binds every other participant in the 
international legal system. In particular, a corpora-
tion cannot be permitted to commit genocide, crimes 
against humanity or war crimes, given that every 
other participant on the plane of international law is 
prohibited from doing so. 
 In addition to the foregoing considerations, one 
must at all times keep in view the clear pronounce-
ment of the International Court of Justice: “Respon-
sibility is the necessary corollary of a right.” 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. 
v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (Feb. 5). This is a straight-
forward application of Hohfeldian jural correlativity, 
in which a right in someone entails an obligation for 
someone else implicated in the violation. As a princi-
ple of international law, this simply means that the 
person or entity implicated in the violation of the 
right bears an obligation to make reparation for the 
violation. 
 
II. Corporate Civil Liability Helps Promote 
the International Legal Policy of Ensur-
ing Accountability for Human Rights Vio-
lations 
 As a matter separate from international law’s 
requirement that perpetrators of human rights viola-
tions must offer guarantees of non-repetition, there is 
a clear international legal principle of promoting 
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accountability for human rights violations already 
committed. 
 The clear course of international human rights 
law is to require accountability on the part of every 
person or entity that enjoys recognition in interna-
tional law. Elements of the principle of promoting 
accountability include: state responsibility for human 
rights violations; individual criminal responsibility 
for gross human rights violations, see Rome Statute, 
supra; complementarity of jurisdiction between 
national judiciaries and international tribunals with 
respect to gross violations of human rights, see id.; 
and, responsibility of States and the international 
community to protect persons from gross human 
rights violations. See UN Secretary General, A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility – Report of 
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [herein-
after A More Secure World]. 
 The principle of promoting accountability has 
moved international law to a point where it is taken 
for granted nowadays that a State may be held ac-
countable by way of civil remedies for any violation of 
human rights attributable to it. It is, however, im-
portant to recall that this was not always the case. In 
the first half of the twentieth century, States could 
not be held accountable for the violation of their own 
citizens’ rights, because notions of sovereignty pre-
vented States from concerning themselves with what 
was considered the internal affairs of one another. 
How state officials treated their own citizens was 
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then considered an internal affair of that State. See 
Louis Henkin et al., Human Rights 136 (2d ed. 2009). 
 With the development of modern international 
human rights law after World War II, that objection 
was overridden. See id. at 136-41. International law 
now recognizes that the obligation to respect human 
rights entails an incidental obligation of accountabil-
ity owed to the whole world: an obligation erga 
omnes, as the International Court of Justice stated. 
See Barcelona Traction, supra at 32. The doctrinal 
products of this obligation erga omnes include: the 
idea of universal jurisdiction for the criminal prosecu-
tion of natural persons who committed gross human 
rights violations, see, e.g., Luc Reydams, Universal 
Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal 
Perspectives (2003); the establishment of internation-
al criminal courts and tribunals; and, most recently, 
acceptance of the doctrine that national authorities 
and the international community have a responsibil-
ity to protect citizens from the most serious human 
rights violations – namely, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. See 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 
(Oct. 24, 2005); see also A More Secure World, supra. 
 Just as international law has evolved to hold 
States accountable for human rights violations, 
international law has also evolved to hold specific 
human beings accountable for gross human rights 
violations. The Nuremberg defendants notably 
argued that “international law [was] concerned with 
the actions of sovereign States and provide[d] no 
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punishment for individuals; and further, that where 
the act in question [was] an act of state, those who 
[carried] it out [were] not personally responsible, but 
[were] protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
the State.” The Trial of German Major War Crimi-
nals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribu-
nal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (October 
1, 1946), 446 [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment]. 
However, the judges of the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT) rejected that argument, relying 
significantly on the jurisprudence of this Court. See 
id., at 446, citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
As part of its reasoning, the IMT delivered the follow-
ing classic international legal dictum: “Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not 
by abstract entities and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions of inter-
national law be enforced.” Nuremberg Judgment, at 
447. This judgment helped crystallize the interna-
tional legal principle of individual criminal responsi-
bility for international crimes. 
 Unfortunately, the Second Circuit in Kiobel 
misinterpreted that classic Nuremberg dictum. The 
point of the dictum was not to limit responsibility to 
natural persons alone, as the Second Circuit suggest-
ed. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 
111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). Rather, the point was to reject 
an argument of impunity by extending accountability 
to the human defendants who claimed, like the corpo-
rate defendants in Kiobel, that they could not be held 
accountable under international law. 
20 
 Indeed, the argument for impunity advanced by 
the Second Circuit in Kiobel is remarkably similar to 
the argument that the IMT considered and rejected in 
the Nuremberg judgment. Notably, at the time the 
Nuremberg Tribunal rendered its judgment, there 
was not a universal practice of imposing criminal 
responsibility on natural persons for violations of 
international law. It is hard, therefore, to resist the 
speculation that had the Second Circuit majority 
dominated the bench of the IMT in 1946, they might 
well have held that the individual defendants were 
not accountable because, at that time, individual 
criminal responsibility had not attained the status of 
“a discernable, much less universally recognized, 
norm of customary law,” just as they held in 2010 
that corporations were not accountable because 
corporate liability had not attained the requisite level 
of universal practice. See Kiobel, supra, at 149. As 
Judge Leval correctly observed in his concurring 
opinion in Kiobel: “If past judges had followed the 
majority’s reasoning, we would have had no Nurem-
berg trials, which for the first time imposed criminal 
liability on natural persons complicit in war crimes; 
no subsequent international tribunals to impose 
criminal liability for violation of international law 
norms; and no judgments in U.S. courts under the 
ATS, compensating victims for the violation of fun-
damental human rights.” Id. at 153 (Leval, J., con-
curring). 
 As with States and natural persons, artificial 
entities have not escaped legal censure for violation of 
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international legal norms, including human rights 
norms. There is no convincing reason to accept that 
States and natural persons should be held accounta-
ble for gross violations of human rights, while deny-
ing similar accountability for business entities 
organized as corporations. Indeed, business corpora-
tions never truly escaped accountability. As Judge 
Posner correctly observed, writing for the Seventh 
Circuit: “At the end of the Second World War the 
allied powers dissolved German corporations that had 
assisted the Nazi war effort ... and did so on the 
authority of customary international law.” Flomo v. 
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 
(7th Cir. 2011).  
 Moreover, other tribunals at Nuremberg explicit-
ly recognized the liability of corporations for viola-
tions of international law in the judgments against 
executives of IG Farbenindustrie and Krupp, two 
corporations implicated in Nazi crimes. In the Krupp 
case the Military Tribunal held as follows:  
We conclude from the credible evidence be-
fore us that the confiscation of the Austin 
plant based upon German-inspired anti-
Jewish laws and its subsequent detention by 
the Krupp firm constitute a violation of Arti-
cle 48 of the Hague Regulations which re-
quires that the laws in force in an occupied 
country be respected; that it was also a viola-
tion of Article 46 of the Hague Regulations 
which provides that private property must be 
respected; that the Krupp firm, through de-
fendants ..., voluntarily and without duress 
22 
participated in these violations ... and that 
there was no justification for such action. 
United States v. Krupp, IX Trials of War Criminals 
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under 
Control Council Law No. 10, 1351-52 (1952). 
 In the I.G. Farben case, the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal held that the Farben conglomerate had 
violated the prohibition of pillage under Article 47 of 
the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of 
War: 
Similarly, where a private individual or a ju-
ristic person becomes a party to unlawful 
confiscation of public or private property by 
planning and executing a well-defined design 
to acquire such property permanently, acqui-
sition under such circumstances subsequent 
to the confiscation constitutes conduct in vio-
lation of the Hague Regulations.... The result 
was the enrichment of Farben and the build-
ing of its greater chemical empire through 
the medium of occupancy at the expense of 
the former owners. Such action on the part of 
Farben constituted a violation of rights of 
private property, protected by the Laws and 
Customs of War. And in the instance involv-
ing private property, the permanent acquisi-
tion was in violation of the Hague 
Regulations which limits the occupying pow-
er to a mere usufruct of real estate. The 
forms of the transactions were varied and in-
tricate, and were reflected in corporate 
agreements well calculated to create the illu-
sion of legality. But the objective of pillage, 
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plunder and spoliation stands out, and there 
can be no uncertainty as to the actual re-
sult.... With reference to the charges in the 
present indictment concerning Farben’s ac-
tivities in Poland, Norway, Alsace Lorraine 
and France, we find that the proof estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that of-
fences against property as defined in Control 
Council Law No. 10 were committed by 
Farben, and that these offences were con-
nected with, and an inextricable part of the 
German policy for occupied countries as 
above described. 
United States v. Krauch (The I.G. Farben Case), VIII 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Mili-
tary Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
1131-32, 1140-41 (1952). 
 Therefore, although the International Military 
Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to subject corpora-
tions to criminal liability, the Nuremberg judgments 
made clear that corporations can be held accountable 
under international law for gross human rights 
violations committed by corporate agents on behalf of 
a corporation. The fact that a particular tribunal 
lacks authority to impose criminal punishment on 
corporations does not contradict the proposition that 
corporations can and should be held accountable for 
violations of fundamental human rights norms. 
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III. General Principles of Law Recognized by 
Civilized Nations Support Civil Liability 
for Corporations that Commit Serious 
Human Rights Violations 
 The Statute of the International Court of Justice 
directs the Court to decide cases in accordance with 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.” Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice, art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. Similarly, the Restatement of For-
eign Relations Law directs U.S. courts to apply 
“[g]eneral principles common to systems of national 
law ... as an independent source of [international] 
law. That source of law may be important when there 
has not been practice by states sufficient to give the 
particular principle status as customary law and the 
principle has not been legislated by general interna-
tional agreement.” Restatement (Third) of United 
States Foreign Relations Law, §102 cmt. l (1987). This 
Court has often consulted general principles of law to 
establish a rule of decision in cases presenting claims 
based on international law. See, e.g., Factor v. 
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287-88 (1933); United 
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 163-80 (1820). Indeed, 
this Court has previously relied on general principles 
of law to support a finding of corporate liability for a 
violation of international law. See First National City 
Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 
462 U.S. 611, 621-33 (1983). 
 Virtually every nation in the world imposes civil 
liability on artificial persons for the tortious conduct 
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of their agents. Hence, the principle that corporations 
are subject to civil liability for the wrongful conduct 
of corporate agents is a “general principle of law 
recognized by civilized nations.” See Brief of Amici 
Curiae International Human Rights Organizations 
and International Law Experts in Support of Peti-
tioners. 
 The Second Circuit majority in Kiobel completely 
disregarded “general principles of law” as an inde-
pendent source of international legal rules. Instead, 
the majority focused exclusively on customary inter-
national law. However, treaties and customary inter-
national law are not the only sources of international 
legal rules. The ICJ Statute identifies “general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations” as an 
important third source of international law, especially 
when treaties and customary international law do not 
provide clear answers to questions that arise in 
litigation. See I.C.J. Statute, supra, art. 38(1)(c). 
Therefore, the Kiobel majority erred by failing to 
consult this important source of international law. 
 According to Professor Manley Hudson – a for-
mer Judge of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, former Harvard professor, and one of the 
preeminent American international lawyers of his 
generation – “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations” are a source of international law 
that: 
empowers the Court to go outside the field 
in which States have expressed their will to 
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accept certain principles of law as governing 
their relations inter se, and to draw upon 
principles common to various systems of 
municipal law or generally agreed upon 
among interpreters of municipal law. It au-
thorizes use to be made of analogies found in 
the national law of the various States. It 
makes possible the expansion of internation-
al law along lines forged by legal thought 
and legal philosophy in different parts of the 
world.  
Manley O. Hudson, The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 1920-1942 611 (1943). More succinctly, 
Lord Phillimore, who proposed the formulation now 
embodied in article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, had 
explained general principles as those “accepted by all 
nations in foro domestico.” Bin Cheng, General Prin-
ciples of Law as Applied by International Courts and 
Tribunals 25 (1994). 
 As a source of international law, general princi-
ples of law are derived directly from shared features 
of municipal legal orders. They do not require an 
intermediate process of uniform practice of States in 
their relations with each other. Hence, general prin-
ciples of law must not be confused with customary 
international law, which depends on universality of 
the practice of States oriented towards the interna-
tional plane. According to Professor Bin Cheng, a 
renowned authority on general principles of law as a 
source of international law:  
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In Article 38[(1)(a)] ... custom is used in a 
strict sense, being confined to what is a gen-
eral practice among States accepted by them 
as law. General practice among nations, as 
well as the recognition of its legal character, 
is therefore required.... In the definition of 
the third source of international law [general 
principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions], there is also the element of recogni-
tion on the part of civilized peoples, but the 
requirement of general practice is absent.... 
The recognition of these principles in the 
municipal law of civilized peoples, where the 
conception of law is already highly devel-
oped, gives the necessary confirmation and 
evidence of the juridical character of the 
principle concerned.  
Bin Cheng, supra at 24. 
 In a recent case before the International Court of 
Justice. Judge Simma applied this approach in his 
separate opinion and “engaged in some research in 
comparative law to see whether anything resembling 
a ‘general principle of law’ within the meaning of 
Article 38, paragraph 1(c) of the Statute of the Court 
can be developed from solutions arrived at in domes-
tic law to come to terms with the problem of multiple 
tortfeasors.” Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 
161, 354 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Simma) 
(emphasis added). On the basis of the recognition of 
the principle of joint and several liability in the 
municipal law of both common law and civil law 
jurisdictions, Judge Simma concluded “that we find 
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ourselves here in what I would call a textbook situa-
tion calling for such an exercise in legal analogy.” Id. 
 
A. Application of General Principles in 
this Case Promotes Justice  
 The preceding argument demonstrates that, in 
the absence of treaty or custom, general principles of 
law derived from municipal law offer a rich source of 
principles of law and justice in the international 
sphere. The usual concern in relying on general 
principles of law as a source of international law has 
always been that their application may lead to distor-
tion or injustice in particular cases. See, e.g., 1 
Oppenheim’s International Law 37 (Robert Jennings 
& Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). Naturally, any 
concern about distortion or injustice would then 
require specific and rational considerations that 
engage reasonable apprehensions. Corporate civil 
liability for human rights violations engages no such 
concern. To the contrary, a ruling that corporations 
cannot be held liable for human rights violations 
would be unjust: since corporations have extensive 
rights under international law, it makes no sense to 
exempt them from liability when they violate the 
rights of others. 
 International law has long recognized that 
corporations have legal personality, which entails 
certain rights and responsibilities. In the recent case 
of Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the ICJ dealt with the 
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question of corporate personality and its consequenc-
es as follows: 
The Court notes that the Parties have re-
ferred frequently to the case concerning the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Com-
pany, Limited (Belgium v. Spain). This in-
volved a public limited company whose 
capital was represented by shares.... As the 
Court recalled in the Barcelona Traction 
case, “[t]here is ... no need to investigate the 
many different forms of legal entity provided 
for by the municipal laws of States.” ... What 
matters, from the point of view of interna-
tional law, is to determine whether or not 
these [corporate entities] have a legal per-
sonality independent of their members.... In 
determining whether a company possesses 
independent and distinct legal personality, 
international law looks to the rules of the rel-
evant domestic law.  
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 
Preliminary Objections, 2007 I.C.J. 190, 194 (May 24) 
(emphasis added). 
 Indeed, in the Barcelona Traction case itself, the 
first case in which the ICJ addressed the concept of 
corporate personality, the Court clearly recognized 
that “[t]hese [corporate] entities have rights and 
obligations peculiar to themselves.” Barcelona Trac-
tion, supra, at 34. Similarly, in his commentary on 
corporations in international law, Professor Peter 
Muchlinski observed:  
30 
The act of incorporation creates a legal per-
son separate from the owners and managers 
of the underlying enterprise. This allows for 
the creation of a separate capital fund to be 
applied for the purposes of the corporation, 
in that the corporation acquires the right to 
own its own assets, to enter into contracts in 
its own name, to pledge its assets to credi-
tors, and to be held liable for its actions.  
Peter Muchlinski, Corporations in International Law, 
in The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Interna-
tional Law, online edition (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 
2008) (emphasis added), available at http://www. 
mpepil.com. There is therefore no question that 
corporations have obligations for their own errors in 
international law. 
 In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court recog-
nized the tremendous influence of corporations in 
international affairs. The Court noted “the profound 
transformations which have taken place in the eco-
nomic life of nations.” It then added: “These latter 
changes have given birth to municipal institutions, 
which have transcended frontiers and have begun to 
exercise considerable influence on international 
relations. One of these phenomena which has a 
particular bearing on the present case is the corpo-
rate entity.” Barcelona Traction, supra, at 33. 
 Speaking about the need to accord corporations 
recognition in international law, the ICJ continued as 
follows:  
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In this field international law is called upon 
to recognize institutions of municipal law 
that have an important and extensive role in 
the international field. This does not neces-
sarily imply drawing any analogy between 
its own institutions and those of municipal 
law, nor does it amount to making rules of 
international law depend upon categories of 
municipal law. All it means is that interna-
tional law has had to recognize the corporate 
entity as an institution created by States in a 
domain essentially within their domestic ju-
risdiction.  
Id. Thus, according to the ICJ, international law 
recognizes that corporations have the powers, duties 
and liabilities assigned to them by domestic law. 
 Naturally, to protect the rights of these municipal 
institutions that have transcended frontiers and 
exerted such considerable influence in international 
relations, “calls for a transparent, stable, and pre-
dictable investment environment have given rise to 
specialized rules of international law that offer pro-
tection to the assets of corporate investors among 
others.” Muchlinski, supra, ¶ 5. Hence, a robust 
subset of international law has developed – including 
international commercial arbitration, investment 
disputes and mixed claim courts – to protect the 
rights of corporations. 
 It would then be highly inappropriate to main-
tain that corporate rights – as opposed to corporate 
liabilities – are the only jural correlative that flows 
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from international law’s recognition of corporate 
personality as an incident of the “general principles of 
law recognized by civilized nations.” There is no 
rational basis for such a conclusion. The jurispru-
dence of the International Court of Justice flatly 
negates such a position. So, too, do many internation-
al instruments that have imposed legal obligations on 
corporations. See Harold Hongju Koh, Separating 
Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility 
Litigation, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 263 (2004) (providing a 
useful summary of these instruments). The claim 
that international law grants corporations rights 
without liabilities amounts to a distortion of the idea 
of corporate personality. 
 
B. The Absence of an International Fo-
rum to Enforce Corporate Criminal 
Liability is Irrelevant 
 In Kiobel, the Second Circuit claimed that the 
absence of criminal responsibility for “juridical per-
sons” in the ICC Statute resulted from a rejection of 
the idea during treaty negotiations, thus suggesting 
that international law is inclined to grant immunity 
to corporations for human rights violations. See 
Kiobel, supra, at 119. This claim lacks evidentiary 
support. There is contrary information indicating 
that criminal responsibility for juridical persons, 
which had been in earlier drafts of the Statute, 
disappeared from the final document because “time 
was running out,” not because of a deliberate choice 
to exclude it. See Per Saland, International Criminal 
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Law Principles, in The International Criminal Court: 
The Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotia-
tions, Results 189, 199 (Roy Lee ed., 1999). 
 Regardless, it is clear that several States Parties 
to the ICC Statute have included corporate criminal 
responsibility in municipal legislation they adopted to 
implement the ICC Statute. These parallel trends in 
national legal systems provide further evidence of a 
“general principle of law recognized by civilized 
nations,” which supports corporate criminal liability 
for egregious human rights violations. 
 For example, corporations and other private legal 
persons can be prosecuted for genocide and crimes 
against humanity under Article 213-3 of the French 
Penal Code. If a corporation is found guilty, it can be 
dissolved, barred from exercising its functions for a 
certain period, fined, or ordered to make reparation. 
Additionally, the French government has the power to 
confiscate part or all of the corporation’s assets in 
accordance with Articles 131-39 and Article 213-3 of 
the French Penal Code. Moreover, Article 689-11 of 
the French Code of Penal Procedure, as amended in 
2010 to implement the ICC Statute, authorizes 
French courts to exercise jurisdiction over crimes 
against humanity and genocide committed abroad by 
French nationals, including both French corporations 
and natural persons. 
 In Canada, section 2 of the Criminal Code and 
section 1 of the Criminal Code Amendment Act (2003) 
define the term “persons” to include both human 
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beings and corporate entities. The Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act, which enables the 
operation in Canada of the norms contained in the 
ICC Statute, provides: “Every person is guilty of an 
indictable offence who commits: (a) genocide; (b) a 
crime against humanity; or (c) a war crime.” Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, c. 24, ch. 4(1) 
(2000) (Can.). Moreover, section 2(2) of that statute 
states: “Unless otherwise provided, words and ex-
pressions used in this Act have the same meaning as 
in the Criminal Code.” Id. at 2(2). Thus, Canadian 
national law authorizes criminal prosecution of 
corporations that commit crimes covered by the ICC 
Statute. 
 In Australia, the Criminal Code “applies to 
bodies corporate in the same way as it applies to 
individuals” with “modifications ... made necessary by 
the fact that criminal liability is being imposed on 
bodies corporate.” Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 12.1(1) 
(Austl.). Moreover, a corporation may be found guilty 
of any offence, including an offence punishable by 
imprisonment. See id., § 12.1(2). Division 268 of the 
Australian Criminal Code proscribes “genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes 
against administration of the justice of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.” 
 Ultimately, though, an objection founded on a 
perceived absence of a strong norm of corporate 
criminal responsibility in international law amounts 
to a mere smoke screen. The caution seen in the 
domestic realm in the area of corporate criminal 
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responsibility has never restricted the civil liability of 
corporations for the tortious conduct of their agents. 
There is no doubt that domestic legal systems were 
once hesitant to impose criminal liability on corpora-
tions. See Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal 
Responsibility (2d ed. 2001); Wayne R. LaFave, Crim-
inal Law § 13.5 (5th ed. 2010); Sara Sun Beale, A 
Response to Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1481, 1493-95 (2009); Andrew 
Weissmann et al., Reforming Corporate Criminal 
Liability to Promote Responsible Corporate Behavior 
(U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Oct. 2008). 
That initial hesitancy was inspired by notions of 
moral autonomy and personal responsibility for 
criminal conduct. See Andrew Ashworth, Principles of 
Criminal Law, 146-54 (6th ed. 2009). However, the 
cautious approach to corporate criminal liability has 
never previously been thought to provide a rationale 
for restricting the civil liability of corporations for the 
wrongful acts of their agents. See Beale, supra, at 
1481; see also Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 3 Report of the 
ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in 
International Crimes (2008). 
 
IV. Corporate Civil Liability is Consistent 
with the Principle of Complementarity 
Between International and Domestic Le-
gal Regimes 
 Applying the Alien Tort Statute to impose civil 
liability on corporations for international human 
rights violations is wholly consistent with the 
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principle of complementarity between domestic and 
international legal regimes. All major international 
human rights treaties require States to take the 
necessary steps – consistent with their domestic legal 
systems and with the provisions of that specific treaty 
– to adopt the measures necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the particular treaty.  
 Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights illustrates this point. That 
article states: “Where not already provided for by 
existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present 
Covenant, to adopt such other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant.” ICCPR, supra, art. 2(2). Similar 
provisions are included in: the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, supra, art. 6; the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, supra, art. 14(1); the 
International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, supra, art. 83; the Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wom-
en, art. 2-8, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 2 & 4, 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; the Optional Protocol 
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to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Por-
nography, art. 1, 3 & 4, May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 
13,095, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227; the Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, art. 4(2), 
6(1) & 6(3), May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,094, 2173 
U.N.T.S. 222; the Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities, art. 4, 7 & 8, Dec. 13, 2006, 
2515 U.N.T.S. 3; and the International Convention for 
the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance, art. 3, 4 & 6, May 1, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 441. 
 None of these treaties excludes corporations from 
the set of persons whom the State is required to 
regulate for the purpose of achieving complete protec-
tion of international human rights. 
 The principle of complementarity – which em-
phasizes national legal mechanisms as important 
instruments for enforcing both treaties and custom-
ary international law – is a rule of both necessity and 
good faith among nations, given the dearth of inter-
national mechanisms for enforcing international law. 
See Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of 
International Law: Insights from the Theory & Prac-
tice of Enforcement 328 (2008).  
 The principle of complementarity that is consist-
ently found in contemporary international human 
rights treaties comports fully with what Vattel de-
scribed as a mutual duty of nations to support and 
promote the international order as the “society of the 
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human race.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Na-
tions (Charles G. Fenwick trans.), Book II, chap. I, at 
113-14 (1916). By virtue of this principle of customary 
international law, nations “owe one another all the 
duties which the safety and welfare of that society 
require.” Id. at 113. 
 An interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute that 
encompasses corporate liability for violations of 
international human rights law, in accordance with 
ordinary U.S. domestic principles of corporate liabil-
ity, is indeed an essential component of the comple-
mentarity between international law and its 
enforcement through domestic legal mechanisms. 
 
V. Corporate Civil Liability is Consistent 
with the Idea of Orderly Redress of 
Grievances According to the Rule of Law 
 Finally, it is worth recalling recent events involv-
ing people who sought extra-legal solutions because 
they felt excluded from the rule of law. Such events 
reveal the folly of those who would place corporations 
beyond the rule of law when they are implicated in 
gross international human rights violations. Indeed, 
such events call to mind a crucial forewarning that 
motivated the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948 – an instrument correctly 
described by the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill as 
“the great post-war statement of principle associated 
with the name of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt.” Tom 
Bingham, The Rule of Law 6 (2010). The Universal 
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Declaration expressed that warning in the following 
terms: “Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebel-
lion against tyranny and oppression, that human 
rights should be protected by the rule of law.” Univer-
sal Declaration, supra, Preamble. It would be mistak-
en to consider that oppression, in the manner of gross 
human rights violations, is the preserve of wicked 
governments, never effected or supported by powerful 
corporations. 
 Here, one recognizes the accuracy of the observa-
tion that “legal theory will never be as precise as 
physics.” Thomas Smith, The Uses and Abuses of 
Corporate Personality, 2 Stan. Agora 69, 70 (2001). 
International law certainly shares this shortcoming, 
perhaps more so than any other branch of law. Yet 
international law, despite its imperfections, must be 
allowed a continued role as an avenue for orderly 
expression and resolution of grievances, in order to 
deny the powerless an excuse to resort to illegitimate 
means of settling scores with the powerful. In an-
swering the question about the raison d’être of inter-
national law, Martti Koskenniemi reminds us that 
international law:  
provides the shared surface – the only such 
surface – on which political adversaries rec-
ognize each other as such and pursue their 
adversity in terms of something shared, in-
stead of seeking to attain full exclusion – 
‘outlawry’ – of the other. Its value and its 
misery lie in its being the fragile surface of 
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political community among social agents – 
States, other communities, individuals – who 
disagree about social purposes but do this 
within a structure that invites them to argue 
in terms of an assumed universality.  
Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law For?, 
in International Law 89, 110-11 (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., 2003). 
 These considerations surely demonstrate the 
short-sightedness of the strategy of putting corpora-
tions beyond the rule of international law. It is simply 
not in anyone’s best interest, least of all the corpora-
tions themselves. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated above, corporations should 
not be exempt from tort liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute for violations of the law of nations such as 
torture, extra-judicial killing and crimes against 
humanity. 
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